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HIS article discusses judicial developments relating to the Texas
law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other es-
tate planning matters during the Survey period of October 1, 2001
through November 1, 2002. The reader is warned that not all cases de-
cided during the Survey period are presented and not all aspects of each
cited case are analyzed. You must read and study the full text and peti-
tion history of each case before relying on it or using it as precedent.
The discussion of most cases includes a moral, that is, the important
lesson to be learned from the case. By recognizing situations which have
lead to time consuming and costly litigation in the past, the reader may be




The normally simple matter of ascertaining the identity of a decedent's
spouse may actually cause more problems than anticipated, as demon-
strated in the case of In re Estate of Loveless.' After Intestate's death,
two women claimed to be Intestate's spouse.2 Rosa claimed to be mar-
ried to Intestate while Wanda asserted that Intestate had divorced Rosa
and married her.3 Wanda moved for summary judgment that she was
Intestate's spouse and presented evidence including a divorce decree,
marriage certificate, pleadings in which Intestate referred to Rosa as his
ex-spouse, and income tax returns.4 To counter this evidence, Rosa pro-
duced a Honduran marriage certificate showing that Intestate remarried
Rosa four months after they were originally divorced. 5 The court granted
Wanda's motion and Rosa appealed. 6
The appellate court reversed because Rosa presented evidence suffi-
cient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had re-
1. In re Estate of Loveless, 64 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
2. Id. at 568.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 571.
5. Id. at 571-72.
6. Id. at 572.
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married Intestate, which would have made Wanda's marriage invalid.7
Rosa had a marriage certificate dated after their divorce and there was no
evidence showing that Rosa and Intestate were subsequently re-di-
vorced. 8 Wanda did not produce evidence to show as a matter of law that
Rosa's remarriage was invalid or that they were divorced prior to Wanda
and Intestate's marriage.9 In addition, the court determined that Rosa
was not equitably or judicially estopped from claiming to have remarried
Intestate even though Rosa had sued to enforce the divorce decree after
allegedly remarrying Intestate and did not object when her attorney re-
ferred to Intestate as her ex-husband. 10
B. NON-MARITAL CHILD
The importance of purchasers of real property obtaining title insurance
to protect against the risk that a non-marital child of one of the prior
owners will successfully assert a claim to the property is shown by the
case of Jeter v. McGraw."1
Husband and Wife were married in 1931.12 In 1935, Husband fathered
Non-Marital Child. 13 Husband died in 1947, still married and without
other children, owning a 25% interest in certain real property as his com-
munity property share.' 4 In the early 1980s, Wife conveyed all of her
interest in this property to Grantee. 15 Non-Marital Child now claims that
Husband's 25% passed to him under intestacy, rather than to Wife.' 6 On
the other hand, Grantee asserts that Non-Marital Child must establish
paternity under the statutes as they existed when Husband died. 17
Grantee thus argues that Non-Marital Child is precluded from inheriting
because the statute permitted a non-marital child to inherit from the fa-
ther only if the father subsequently married the non-marital child's
mother.' 8 The trial court ruled in favor of Grantee, and Non-Marital
Child appealed. 19
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion by the trial court.20 The court first examined Grantee's claim that
Non-Marital Child is precluded from asserting paternity by the then-ex-
isting statute.2' The court indicated that it would be unconstitutional to
7. Id. at 580.
8. Id. at 571-72.
9. Id. at 576.
10. Id. at 579-80.
11. Jeter v. McGraw, 79 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet. denied).
12. Id. at 212.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 213.
16. Id. at 214.
17. Id. at 213.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 212.
20. Id. at 216.
21. Id. at 213.
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apply this statute retroactively, 22 citing both Texas and United States Su-
preme Court opinions, which have held that statutes such as the 1947
Texas provision are unconstitutional and may not be given effect.
23
Grantee next raised the affirmative defense of the running of the four-
year statute of limitations because Non-Marital Child knew about his true
paternity for decades more than four years and did not timely pursue his
claim.24 The court examined the two leading Texas cases on the issue and
found a key distinguishing point.25 In York v. Flowers,26 the non-marital
child was allowed to pursue her claim despite the passage of more than
four years because the suit was for the recovery of certain real property
and thus outside of the residuary four year period in section 16.051 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedy Code.27 However, the non-marital chil-
dren in Cantu v. Sapenter28 were precluded from asserting their claims
after the four year period elapsed because the action was only to establish
heirship and there was no real property issue before the court.29 Accord-
ingly, Non-Marital Child was not bound by the four year statute of limita-
tions because he is attempting to recover specific real property.30 The
court, however, notes that Non-Marital Child could be barred by adverse





1. Temporal Nature of Evidence
In re Neville32 serves as an important reminder that a proponent of a
will may need to present evidence of the testator's capacity, not just on
the date of will execution, but with regard to surrounding time periods as
well.33 The jury found that Testatrix lacked testamentary capacity when
she executed a will in 1998 and thus the trial court admitted Testatrix's
1992 will to probate. 34 Proponents of the 1998 will appealed on the basis
that there was direct evidence that Testatrix had capacity on the date she
executed the 1998 will.35
The appellate court affirmed.36 Proponents asserted that the Supreme
22. Id. at 215.
23. Id. at 213-16.
24. Id. at 215.
25. Id.
26. York v. Flowers, 872 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
27. Id. at 16 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. COoE § 16.051 (Vernon 1997).
28. Cantu v. Sapenter, 937 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
29. Jeter, 79 S.W.3d at 215-16.
30. Id. at 216.
31. Id.
32. In re Neville, 67 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
33. Id. at 523-24.
34. Id. at 523.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 527.
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Court of Texas case of Lee v. Lee37 should be interpreted as prohibiting
the consideration of evidence of a testatrix's mental condition before or
after the signing of the will if there is direct evidence of the testatrix's
mental soundness on the actual date of will execution.38 The court re-
jected this analysis as follows:
It has always been the rule in Texas that, although the proper inquiry
is whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time he exe-
cuted the will, the court may also look to the testator's state of mind
at other times if those times tend to show his state of mind on the
day the will was executed. Evidence pertaining to those other times,
however, must show that the testator's condition persisted and prob-
ably was the same as that which existed at the time the will was
signed. 39
The court examined the evidence, such as testimony from doctors that
Testatrix had a brain tumor that adversely affected her mental soundness
at all times.40 This evidence, the court concluded, was sufficient to sup-
port the jury's finding that Testatrix lacked capacity even though Propo-
nents presented the testimony of several individuals which tended to
show that Testatrix had capacity on the date she executed the 1998 will.41
2. Sufficiency of Evidence
In the case of In re Estate of Graham,42 Testator executed a will naming
two of his nieces as the primary beneficiaries. 43 Testator's seven other
nieces and nephews contested the will on several grounds including lack
of testamentary capacity.44 The trial court determined that Testator had
testamentary capacity and the contestants appealed.45
The appellate court affirmed.46 The court reviewed the extensive evi-
dence the will's proponents submitted and held that it was sufficient to
support the trial court's grant of summary judgment.47 The court ex-
plained that the contestants did not submit any evidence raising a fact
issue regarding the testator's capacity to execute the will.48 Accordingly,
it is essential for a person contesting a will on the basis of lack of testa-
mentary capacity to present evidence to support the allegation. 49
37. Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1968).
38. In re Neville, 67 S.W.3d at 524.
39. Id. at 525.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 526-27.
42. In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
43. Id. at 602.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 612.
47. Id. at 608.
48. Graham, 69 S.W.3d at 607-08.




In re Estate of Graham50 also demonstrates that a person contesting a
will on the basis of lack of testamentary intent must present evidence to
support the allegation. Testator executed a will naming two of his nieces
as the primary beneficiaries. 5' Testator's seven other nieces and nephews
contested the will on several grounds including lack of testamentary in-
tent.52 The trial court held that Testator executed the will with testamen-
tary intent,53 and the contestants appealed. 54
The appellate court affirmed.55 The court noted that the instrument
was called a will and disposed of Testator's property. 5 6 Testator had dis-
cussed the will with others and handwrote the document before having
another person type it for him.57 This evidence was sufficient to support
the trial court's grant of summary judgment, especially in light of the con-
testants' failure to present any evidence to negate the existence of testa-
mentary intent.58
C. SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT
In re Estate of Graham further shows the importance of having the self-
proving affidavit track the language provided in section 59 of the Texas
Probate Code to avoid claims the affidavit is not in substantial compli-
ance with the statutory form. 59 Testator executed a will naming two of his
nieces as the primary beneficiaries. 60 Testator's seven other nieces and
nephews contested the will on several grounds, including failure to com-
ply with the formalities of a valid will.6 1 The trial court determined that
the will met the requirements of section 59,62 and the contestants
appealed. 63
The appellate court affirmed.64 Although the self-proving affidavit was
not in the form provided in section 59 of the Texas Probate Code, it was
subscribed and acknowledged by the testator and subscribed and sworn
to by the witnesses, and thus it was in substantial compliance. 65 The self-
proving affidavit served as prima facie evidence of the will's proper exe-
cution, and the contestants presented no evidence to rebut the affidavit. 66
50. Id. at 598.




55. Id. at 612.
56. Id. at 606.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 608.
59. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 2003).




64. Id. at 612.
65. Id. at 604.




1. Restraint on Alienation
In Williams v. Williams,67 Testator devised real property to his Chil-
dren.68 The devise provided that if any child wanted to sell his or her
share to someone other than Testator's Siblings, the written consent of all
of the surviving Siblings was required.69 The devise further provided that
after all Siblings die, Children may sell to anyone, but the descendants of
Siblings have a right of first refusal.70 Two of the children conveyed their
interests to third parties without obtaining the prior consent of surviving
Siblings. 71 The remaining children sued to set aside the sales for violating
the terms of the devise. 72 The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the selling children. 73
The appellate court affirmed.74 The provision requiring Testator's Sib-
lings to approve a sale is a restraint on alienation that is against public
policy, and is therefore not enforceable. 75 The court rejected the claim
that the will merely created rights of first refusal;76 only after all of Testa-
tor's Siblings are deceased does the will impose a right of first refusal on
Siblings' descendants. 77 Accordingly, a person wishing to impose restric-
tions on alienation should consider other techniques, such as a trust.
2. Powers of Executor
A testator should carefully select words that clearly impose mandatory
or precatory obligations as the testator desires. A testator should also
avoid mixing words which arguably could reflect conflicting intents to
avoid problems such as those that arose in Vinson v. Brown.78 In Brown,
Testator's will provided that Executor may sell any of Testator's real
property, including land in a particular subdivision. 79 In a subsequent
clause, Executor was given the authority to continue Testator's develop-
ment of that subdivision. 0 Owners of property in the subdivision as-
serted that the will required Executor to finish developing the land as a
subdivision before selling it.81
The court held that Executor was under no obligation to develop the
67. Williams v. Williams, 73 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).





73. Id. at 379.
74. Id. at 380.
75. Id. at 379.
76. Id. at 380.
77. Id.
78. Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
79. Id. at 225.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 230.
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land.82 The court refused to interpret the word "direct" in the phrase
"authorize, empower, and direct" as imposing on Executor a mandatory
duty to develop the land.83 The court also held that the specific provision
dealing with the subdivision did not trump the prior provision granting
Executor the power to sell. 84
E. WILL CONTESTS GENERALLY
A will contestant must present evidence to raise a genuine or material
fact issue to withstand the proponent's motion for summary judgment be-
cause the failure to do so may lead to a summary judgment against the
contestant, as in the case of In re Estate of Flores.85 Testator's will did not
provide for or mention Son, a child who was born out of wedlock but
whose paternity was established over a decade earlier by a court judg-
ment.86 In the section of the will listing Testator's children, Testator
named his other children but not Son.87 Because Son was not a benefici-
ary of the will, he filed a will contest on a variety of grounds including
forgery, lack of proper formalities, mistake, and lack of testamentary ca-
pacity. 88 The trial court granted summary judgment against Son on the
basis that Son's evidence was too weak to support any of the will contest
grounds; that is, his evidence gave rise only to speculation, suspicion, and
surmise -rather than to material or genuine issues of fact.8 9 Son
appealed.90
The appellate court affirmed.9' The court reviewed Son's evidence and
determined that the trial court was correct in determining that the evi-
dence was insufficient to raise jury issues on any of the contested
grounds.92
F. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A person contesting a will on the basis of undue influence must present
evidence beyond mere surmise, opportunity, or suspicion, as seen in the
case of In re Estate of Graham.93 In Graham, Testator executed a will
naming two of his nieces as the primary beneficiaries. 94 Testator's seven
other nieces and nephews contested the will on several grounds, including
that Testator executed the will while being subjected to undue influ-
82. Id. at 231.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. In re Estate of Flores, 76 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
86. Id. at 627.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 628-29.
90. Id. at 629.
91. Id. at 631.
92. Id.
93. Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598.
94. Id. at 602.
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ence.95 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of a summary
judgment that Testator did not execute the will under undue influence.96
The court examined both the family situation and facts surrounding the
execution of the will and found that there was no evidence to support the
contestant's allegation of undue influence.97
G. REMAINDER BENEFICIARY KILLING LIFE TENANT
Medford v. Medford98 points out the dangers of failing to plead and
prove the elements necessary to obtain the desired relief. Father devised
a life estate in a house to Mother with the remainder passing to Son One
and Son Two.99 Son One killed Mother and was convicted of causing
serious bodily injury to an elderly person. 00 Son Two rented the
house.' 0 ' Son One sued to recover one-half of the rental income based
on his status as a tenant in common. 10 2 The trial court granted a take
nothing summary judgment in favor of Son Two. 10 3 Son One appealed. 1°4
The appellate court reversed. 10 5 The court cited Article I, Section 21 of
the Texas Constitution 0 6 and Probate Code § 41(d), 10 7 which provides
that a conviction does not cause a corruption of the blood or forfeiture of
property.10 8 Thus, the only way Son Two could prevent Son One from
receiving the rental income was to demonstrate that a constructive trust
should be imposed on Son One's share of the house because he caused
the death of the life tenant. 10 9 The appellate court held that the convic-
tion alone was not sufficient to support the trial court's imposition of a
constructive trust. 110 Son Two failed to present evidence regarding why
he should be the beneficiary of the constructive trust and failed to iden-
tify the property over which the constructive trust should be imposed.'
The court also concluded that the trial court's take nothing judgment
could not be read as imposing a constructive trust. 1" 2
95. Id.
96. Id. at 611.
97. Id. at 610-11.
98. Medford v. Medford, 68 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).





104. Id. at 245.
105. Id. at 250.
106. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
107. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(d) (Vernon 2003).
108. Medford, 68 S.W.3d at 248.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 249.






1. Resolving Concurrent Jurisdiction
When a problem of concurrent jurisdiction arises, the proper remedy is
to file a plea in abatement with the court lacking dominant jurisdiction.
Failing to remember this proper remedy caused problems in Tovias v.
Wildwood Properties Partnership.1 3 Heirs filed a declaration of heirship
and a wrongful death suit in a county court at law.1 14 Later, Heirs filed a
similar wrongful death suit in a district court in another county." 5 One
of the defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction to contest the district
court's subject matter jurisdiction. 116 The trial court granted the plea," 7
and Heirs appealed.' 18
The appellate court reversed," 19 holding that the district court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the wrongful death suit concurrently with the
county court at law.' 20 Defendants should have filed a plea in abatement
because the county court at law had dominant jurisdiction (the suit was
filed in county court first).'12' Defendant was not entitled to the greater
remedy of dismissal because the district court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion and may have been able to exercise it under certain circumstances. 122
2. Suit Against "Executor"
A decedent's estate is not a legal entity, and thus a plaintiff should sue
the personal representative of a decedent, not the decedent's estate. Fail-
ure to remember this basic principle caused the Plaintiffs in Waste Dispo-
sal Center, Inc. v. Larson 23 considerable difficulty. Plaintiffs sued "the
Estate of Decedent,' 24 and Estate appeared and participated in the
case. 25 At the end of the trial, Estate obtained a directed verdict on
jurisdictional grounds because the estate of a deceased person is not a
legal entity.126 Plaintiffs appealed.127
The appellate court affirmed. 28 The court began its analysis by ex-
113. Tovias v. Wildwood Props. P'ship, 67 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, no pet.).









123. Waste Disposal Ctr., Inc. v. Larson, 74 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2002, pet. denied).







plaining that an estate is not a legal entity that is capable of being sued.129
This defect is a matter of fundamental jurisdiction which cannot be
waived because no one is named as a defendant, and thus, there is no one
to waive the defect.130 Estate's appearance and participation in the case
was irrelevant because Plaintiffs did not sue by name or serve the per-
sonal representative of the estate.131 No estoppel to assert lack of juris-
diction arose because the personal representative did not appear or
participate in the lawsuit. 132
3. Title Issues
The importance of carefully examining probate orders to ensure that
they correctly state the property interests to which the beneficiaries are
entitled is demonstrated in Garza v. Rodriguez.1 33 Correction of errors
at a later time may be difficult or perhaps impossible, resulting in the
intended beneficiaries losing their interests.
Testatrix's will granted Nephew a fee simple interest in her estate, sub-
ject to a shifting executory interest in Sister and her heirs if Nephew died
without lawful issue of his body. 134 However, the court order issued by
the constitutional county court of Starr County in 1957 closing Testatrix's
estate appeared to grant fee simple absolute title to Nephew. 135 The or-
der did not mention Sister's springing executory interest.' 36 No one chal-
lenged this order.1 37 Nephew died without lawful issue and Sister's heirs
asserted ownership to the property by filing a will construction action in
district court in 1986.138 In the 2000 case of Garza v. Rodriguez,139 the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action because
of lack of jurisdiction. 140
Sister's heirs then filed a lawsuit in the statutory county court of Starr
County to establish their interest.141 Nephew's heirs filed a motion to
dismiss, asserting that this suit was a collateral attack on a final order
issued by the constitutional county court in 1957.142 Sister's heirs re-
sponded by alleging that the 1957 order did not directly resolve the title
issue raised by the springing executory interest and that if the order had
divested Sister's heirs of the interest, the court lacked jurisdiction to do
so.143 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and Sister's heirs
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 587.
132. Id.
133. Garza v. Rodriguez, 87 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).




138. Id.; see Garza, 18 S.W.3d at 696.
139. Garza v. Rodriguez, 18 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, reh'g denied).
140. Id. at 695.
141. Garza, 87 S.W.3d at 630.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 630-31.
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appealed. 144
The appellate court reversed. 45 The court held that the constitutional
county court lacked jurisdiction under the laws as they existed in 1957 to
construe Testatrix's will to divest any party of any title interest. 46 Thus,
the 1957 order either did not resolve the title matter or, if it did, the order
was void and subject to collateral attack. 147 The court then concluded
that the statutory county court had jurisdiction to resolve the title
issue. 48
Note that the appellate court was careful to explain that it was not
commenting on the merits of Sister's heirs' claim to the property
interest.149
B. APPEAL
1. Determination of Heirship
A party appealing a probate judgment should clearly indicate to the
appellate court the reason why the party believes the court has jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal. As a matter of course, this issue should be ad-
dressed in the appellate brief. The case of In re Estate of Loveless' 50
demonstrates the problems that may arise when the appellant fails to fol-
low this advice. Although neither party raised the issue of the finality of
the lower court's judgment, the appellate court provided a detailed analy-
sis of whether it had the ability to consider the appeal.' 51 The court re-
viewed the case under the test set forth in the Texas Supreme Court case
of Crowson v. Wakeham,152 which provides that an order in a probate
case is final for appellate purposes when (1) a statute declares that a spec-
ified phase of the probate proceedings is final and appealable, (2) the
order disposes of all issues in the phase of the proceeding for which it was
brought, or (3) a particular order is made final by a severance order
meeting the usual severance criteria. 53
Although section 55(a) of the Texas Probate Code provides that a de-
termination of heirship is a final and appealable judgment,154 the heirship
determination in this case was not final because it did not contain all of
the elements required by section 54.155 Although the trial court order
appears interlocutory because the pleadings raise issues not disposed of
in the order, the court held that the action meets the requirements for
severance and thus severed the action in the interest of judicial effi-
144. Id. at 631.





150. Loveless, 64 S.W.3d at 564.
151. Id. at 569.
152. Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex. 1995).
153. Id. at 783.
154. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 55(a) (Vernon 2003).
155. Loveless, 64 S.W.3d at 570.
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ciency. 156 As a result, the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.' 57
2. Award of Expenses
Problems may result when an appeal of an award of expenses is not
brought within the time period specified under Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 26.1,158 as illustrated in the case of In re Estate of Figueroa-
Gomez.' 59 First, Decedent's estate was closed.' 60 Thereafter, Dependent
Administrator obtained court approval for expenses she incurred in ad-
ministering the estate.161 Independent Administrator then replaced De-
pendent Administrator as the personal representative of the estate.162
Independent Administrator subsequently asked the court to set aside the
award of expenses.1 63 The court refused to do so, and thus Independent
Administrator appealed.1 64
The appellate court affirmed.165 The court held that it had no jurisdic-
tion to hear an appeal of the award of expenses because Independent
Administrator waited over one year to appeal) 66 The trial court's order
was a final judgment according to section 312(d) of the Texas Probate
Code. 167 Because Independent Administrator did not appeal this order
in a timely fashion, the judgment became final and not subject to collat-
eral attack. 68
C. TRANSFER
1. From District Court by Probate Court
In re Swepi 169 teaches the important lesson that merely because an ac-
tion may impact the claims of an estate through collateral estoppel, it is
not sufficient to classify an action as appertaining to or incident to an
estate. Testatrix died in 1976 and the probate court admitted her will in
1977.170 After a long and complex series of events, a suit was filed in the
district court concerning royalty payments on an overriding royalty inter-
est owned by a partnership in which Testator, and subsequently her es-
tate, were former partners. 171 Under section 5B of the Texas Probate
156. Id. at 570-71.
157. See Id. at 569-70.
158. TEX. R. ApP. P. § 261.
159. In re Estate of Figueroa-Gomez, 76 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002,
no pet.).
160. Id. at 534.
161. Id. at 534-35.
162. Id. at 535.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 537.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 312(d) (Vernon 2002)).
168. Id. at 535-36.
169. In re Swepi, 85 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2002).




Code, 172 the probate court transferred to itself the district court law-
suit.173 One of the parties to the district court proceeding objected,
claiming that the district court action was not appertaining to or incident
to Testatrix's estate, and thus the transfer order was improper. 174 The
court of appeals determined that the transfer was proper.
175
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, conditionally granted mandamus,
and directed the probate court to vacate its order transferring the district
court action.' 76 The personal representative of the estate was not and
had never been a party to the district court action.' 77 Accordingly, trans-
fer under section 5B would be proper only if the district court action was
appertaining to or incident to Testatrix's estate.'
78
The court recognized that there are two ways an action may be apper-
taining to or incident to an estate. 79 First, the cause of action may be
expressly listed in section 5A(b), and second, the controlling issue in the
suit may be the settlement, partition, or distribution of an estate.180 The
district court action was not included in the statutory list. Therefore, the
only way for the probate court to have the authority to transfer was if the
controlling issue in the district court action related to the settlement, par-
tition, or distribution of Testatrix's estate.' 8' After conducting an exten-
sive review of the pleadings, evidence, and prior judicial authority on the
issue, the court held that the district court action was not appertaining to
or incident to the estate.' 82
2. Discretionary Nature of Transfer
The case of In re Azle Manor, Inc. 183 arose when a will contest was
pending in a statutory probate court and Executor filed a survival action
in district court.184 Defendants in the district court action requested that
the probate court transfer the survival action to itself under section 5B of
the Texas Probate Code.' 85 The probate court refused. 86 Defendants
then asked the appellate court to grant a writ of mandamus to force the
probate court to transfer the action.' 87
172. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5B (Vernon 2002).
173. Swepi, 85 S.W.3d at 801.
174. Id.
175. Id. (denying mandamus relief).
176. Id. at 801.
177. Id. at 804.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 805.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 808.
183. In re Azle Manor, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, orig. proceed-
ing [leave denied]).
184. Id. at 411-12.





The appellate court refused to grant the writ and rejected Defendants'
argument that the probate court had exclusive, mandatory jurisdiction
over the survival action because the probate court proceedings pre-dated
the survival action and were still pending. a88 The court examined section
5B and concluded that the probate court's ability to transfer is purely
discretionary. 189 The section provides that the statutory probate court
judge "may" transfer a case pending in the district court when it is apper-
taining to or incident to an estate pending in the statutory probate
court. 190 The appellate court found that there was no evidence that the
probate judge's refusal to transfer the case was an abuse of discretion. 191
The court rejected the argument that the part of section 5B that pro-
vides that a cause of action appertaining to or incident to an estate "shall"
be brought in the statutory probate court limits or restricts the discretion-
ary language with regard to the probate court's ability to transfer the
case.192 The court held "that the intent of this language is to direct par-
ties with a cause of action appertaining to estates or incident to an estate
to bring such actions in statutory probate court in the first instance rather
than district court."'193
This case teaches that, if an action appertaining to or incident to an
estate that is pending in a statutory probate court is brought in district
court, the person unhappy with the district court's hearing the case
should have the district court abate the case under section 5B of the
Texas Probate Code because it was brought in the wrong court, rather
than relying on the probate court's permissive ability to transfer the case
to itself.
D. HEIR REPRESENTING ESTATE
Casillas v. Cano'94 demonstrates that a person attempting to appeal a
decision against a now-deceased person should either be appointed as the
personal representative or be certain to prove the facts necessary to
demonstrate the person's right to maintain the appeal. A judgment ex-
isted against Intestate at the time of her death.195 Heir filed an appeal
without first being appointed as the administrator of Intestate's estate.196
The court held that, based on McCampbell v. Henderson,197 Heir could
represent herself in the appeal if she could demonstrate that (1) she is
actually an heir, (2) no administration is pending or planned on Intes-
tate's estate, (3) no personal representative has been appointed, and (4)
188. Id. at 414-15.
189. Id. at 414.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 413.
192. Id. at 414.
193. Id.
194. Casillas v. Cano, 79 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
195. Id. at 589.
196. Id.
197. McCampbell v. Henderson, 50 Tex. 601 (1879).
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no administration is necessary or desired by individuals interested in In-
testate's estate. 198
E. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Avary v. Bank of America'99 shows that an executor defending a
breach of fiduciary duty claim brought by an estate beneficiary will have
a difficult time obtaining a sustainable summary judgment. Decedent
died as the result of a tractor accident triggering the filing of wrongful
death and survival claims.200 Independent Executor, Guardian of the es-
tates of Decedent's minor children, and Defendants participated in a
court-order mediation, which resulted in a court-approved settlement.20 1
Guardian contended that Defendants had made a settlement offer to In-
dependent Executor that Independent Executor had improperly re-
jected.20 2 Later, Independent Executor accepted a lower offer. 20 3
Guardian claims Independent Executor's rejection of the original offer
was a breach of Independent Executor's fiduciary duties.204 The lower
court granted Independent Executor's request for a summary judg-
ment.20 Guardian appealed. 20 6
The appellate court reversed.2°17 The court held that Guardian had
presented more than a scintilla of evidence to support the allegation that
Independent Executor breached its fiduciary duties by failing to disclose
material facts affecting the rights of the estate beneficiaries. 20 8 Accord-
ingly, summary judgment was improper.2°9
F. COMPENSATION
In re Estate of Figueroa-Gomez2I( explains that a court may properly
award a statutory commission to a dependent administrator, even if the
approval comes after the court appoints an independent administrator.
Decedent's estate was closed.2 11 Independent Administrator then re-
placed Dependent Administrator as the personal representative of the
estate.212 Two months after being removed from office, Dependent Ad-
ministrator requested and obtained court approval for a statutory com-
mission.2 13 Independent Administrator subsequently asked the court to
198. Casillas, 79 S.W.3d at 590 (citing Henderson, 50 Tex. at 611).
199. Avary v. Bank of Am., 72 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied).





205. Id. at 786.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 803.
208. Id. at 791.
209. Id. at 793.
210. Figueroa-Gomnez, 76 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
211. Id. at 534.




set aside the compensation award. 214 The court refused to do so and In-
dependent Administrator appealed. 215
The appellate court affirmed.2 16 The court began its analysis by ex-
plaining that the trial court had authority to award a statutory commis-
sion under section 241 of the Texas Probate Code.2 1 7 The court rejected
Independent Administrator's claim that no commission could be awarded
because Dependent Administrator had not filed the administrator's
oath.2 18 The evidence showed that Dependent Administrator had indeed
filed an oath as a temporary administrator and that the commission claim
was for actions she took while serving as the temporary administrator.21 9
The court also rejected Independent Executor's argument that the trial
court had no jurisdiction to award a commission because the estate had
become an independent administration at the time the court made the
award.220 Even though the original dependent administration ceased to
exist when the independent administration began, the trial court retained
jurisdiction over matters relating to the estate.2 21 The court quoted sec-
tion 145(h) of the Texas Probate Code, which provides that actions subse-
quent to the filing of the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims by an
independent executor should proceed without court involvement. 222
However, that section also provides that court involvement is proper if
the Probate Code specifically provides for court action, as it does with
regard to the payment of a commission under section 241 (requiring the
court to act on applications from both dependent and independent ad-
ministrators and requiring a court finding that the estate was managed in
compliance with Probate Code standards).22 3
G. CREDITOR'S CLAIMS
Gorham v. Gates ex. rel. Estate of Badouh224 shows that a creditor of a
beneficiary should not expect the administration of the estate of the ben-
eficiary's benefactor to resolve all of the creditor's concerns. Testatrix
devised real property to Beneficiary. 225 Creditors of Beneficiary planned
to recover their claims from this property. 226 Beneficiary then attempted
to disclaim her interest in this property, but the disclaimer was invalid.227
Under court order, the real property was sold free and clear of all claims
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 537.




221. Id. at 537.
222. Id. (quoting TEX. PROB. Co1E ANN. § 145(h) (Vernon 2003)).
223. Id.
224. Gorham v. Gates ex. rel. Estate of Badouh, 82 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Austin
2002, pet. denied).
225. Id. at 361.




and the proceeds were placed in the registry of the court subject to Credi-
tors' claims.2 28 Creditors appealed asserting that the proceeds should
have been immediately disbursed to them.2 29
The appellate court affirmed.230 The court explained that prior court
proceedings dealt only with the validity of Beneficiary's disclaimer. 231
These proceedings did not resolve the validity of Creditors' claims.232
The court order authorizing the sale merely stated that the property
needed to be sold to satisfy claims and administrative expenses, not just
Creditors' claims.233 The court order did not prioritize the claims.234 Ac-
cordingly, it was appropriate for the probate court to require the pro-
ceeds to be placed in the registry of the court until the validity and
priority of Creditors' claims could be determined.235 The court also indi-
cated that Creditors' reliance on section 338 of the Texas Probate Code
was misplaced because that section deals with claims against the dece-
dent, not claims against a beneficiary. 236
IV. TRUSTS
A. TRUSTEE'S POWERS
As shown in Casillas v. Cano,237 a trustee does not have the ability to
represent a settlor or the settlor's estate. Here, Settlor established an
inter vivos trust naming Daughter as both a cotrustee and beneficiary. 238
After Settlor's death, Daughter contended that she could act on behalf of
Settlor with regard to a lawsuit which was pending when Settlor died. 239
The court rejected Daughter's claim. 240 The Trust Code grants a trus-
tee a full range of powers to fully represent the interests of the trust.241
However, these powers do not include permitting a trustee to represent a
settlor or the settlor's estate.242 Thus, Daughter, as Trustee, had no
standing to prosecute the appeal on behalf of Settlor or her estate.
B. SECTION 142 TRUSTS
In Texas State Bank v. Amaro,243 Beneficiary of a multi-million dollar
228. Id. at 362-63.
229. Id. at 363.
230. Id. at 366.
231. Id. at 363.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 364.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 366.
236. Id. at 364 (referring to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 338 (Vernon 2003)).





242. Id. at 589-90.
243. Tex. State Bank v. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2002).
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trust, created under section 142.005 of the Texas Property Code 244 by the
206th district court, decided that he wanted to obtain the trust property
free of trust.245 He eventually obtained a court order from a different
district court declaring that he had regained full capacity, after which he
demanded that Trustee transfer all trust assets to him.246 Trustee com-
plied, but only after obtaining a court order from the original district
court that terminated the trust.2 47 The order also released Trustee of all
liability since Trustee had at all times properly and appropriately adminis-
tered the trust.2 48 Beneficiary contended that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to issue these orders.2 49
The appellate court found that the 206th district court had continuing
jurisdiction over the trust, both under section 142.005 and the order creat-
ing the trust.250 Accordingly, the 206th district court was not bound by
the other district court's determination that Beneficiary had regained ca-
pacity. The court also found that Trustee properly sought a declaratory
judgment to determine whether Beneficiary had regained capacity and
the trust had ended as well as to approve the final accounting and various
fees.2 51 However, the court held that the district court exceeded its juris-
diction when it determined that Trustee had no liability to the trust, Trus-
tee had used a proper investment philosophy, and that all disbursements
were proper.252 Trustee appealed.253
The Supreme Court of Texas began its analysis of this case by agreeing
that the 206th district court had continuing jurisdiction over the trust and
was thereby not bound by the other district court's capacity determina-
tion.2 54 Likewise, the court affirmed the appellate court's holding that
the district court had exceeded and lacked jurisdiction to decide the tort
liability and investment philosophy matters.2 55 However, the court held
that the district court did have the power to approve distributions, fees,
costs, and expenses. 256
V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
An estate planner must be extremely leery of representing both hus-
band and wife in the estate planning process. In re Taylor 257 shows that,
244. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 142.005 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2003).
245. Tex. State Bank, 87 S.W.3d at 540-41.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 541.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 541-42.





255. Id. at 543.
256. Id. at 543-44.
257. In re Taylor, 67 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
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if the attorney elects to represent both spouses despite current or poten-
tial conflicts of interest, the attorney will likely be precluded from repre-
senting either spouse separately with regard to matters even slightly
related to the estate planning process.2 58
Law Firm represented Husband and Wife in the preparation of their
estate plans, including wills, powers of attorney, and business matters.
259
Later, Law Firm undertook to represent Husband in divorce proceedings
against Wife.260 Wife sought to have Law Firm disqualified from repre-
senting Husband.261 The trial court denied Wife's motion to disqualify,
and in response Wife filed a writ of mandamus.2 62
The appellate court conditionally granted Wife's request for a writ of
mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate the order denying Wife's
motion to disqualify Law Firm.263 The record was clear that Law Firm
represented both Husband and Wife with regard to the business and es-
tate matters, thereby creating a conflict of interest for Law Firm to re-
present Husband in the divorce action.2 64 Wife did not consent to Law
Firm's representation of Husband in the divorce and thus Law Firm was
disqualified. 265 The trial court's failure to grant Wife's motion was held
to be a clear abuse of discretion.2 66
B. MALPRACTICE
Moser v. Davis267 reminds attorneys of the importance of carefully su-
pervising legal secretaries and legal assistants to make certain they do not
perform acts which would be the practice of law without a license. Attor-
ney was in the process of preparing reciprocal wills for Husband and
Wife.268 Wife contacted Attorney's Secretary with information needed to
complete the wills and was told that Attorney was out of town.269 Wife
was adamant that the wills needed to be finalized, so Secretary finished
preparing them and conducted the will execution ceremony. 270 Secretary
then squirreled the wills away in the firm's safe deposit box. 271 Secretary
did not inform Attorney about her foray into "attorney-land. 272 When
Husband died, this sequence of events came to light, including the fact
that Secretary may not have prepared the documents properly.273 Wife
258. Id. at 533-54.
259. Id. at 531.
260. Id. at 532.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 534.
264. Id. at 533.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 534.
267. Moser v. Davis, 79 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).








then sued Attorney for malpractice. 274 The jury determined that Attor-
ney was not responsible for Secretary's conduct because Secretary acted
outside the course and scope of her employment when she prepared the
wills and conducted the execution ceremony. 275 Wife appealed. 276
The appellate court affirmed.2 77 The court carefully reviewed the evi-
dence and determined that the jury had sufficient grounds to support its
finding that Secretary acted outside the scope of her employment.278
There was no evidence to show that her duties were to include tasks
which would be considered the practice of law. 279
C. NON-PROBATE TRANSFERS
The estate planner must carefully inspect the beneficiary designations
on non-probate assets to make certain they provide for the disposition of
property the client desires, as Holley v. Grigg280 demonstrates. Decedent
owned an investment account on the date of his death that named his five
children as beneficiaries. 281 The account also provided that if a benefici-
ary predeceased Decedent, that beneficiary's share would pass to the sur-
viving children. 282 Decedent did not select the option of having a
deceased beneficiary's share pass to the deceased beneficiary's chil-
dren.28 3 When Decedent died, one of his children had predeceased him
and was survived by a child.284 In a summary judgment order, the trial
court held that this child was not entitled to share in the brokerage ac-
count under the express terms of the account.2 85
The appellate court affirmed.286 The brokerage account qualified as a
valid nontestamentary transfer under both section 450 of the Texas Pro-
bate Code and the equivalent Missouri statute, the state whose law gov-
erned the terms of the account. 287 The court held that the account
agreement was unambiguous.2 88 Additionally, there was no evidence
that, even if Decedent had made a unilateral mistake when he executed
the account agreement by not selecting the anti-lapse option, it would not





278. Id. at 167-68.
279. Id. at 168.
280. Holley v. Grigg, 65 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.).




285. Id. at 292.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 293-94 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 2001) and Mo. REV.
STAT. § 461.001 (2002)).
288. Id. at 294.
289. Id. at 295.
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D. INTER Vivos GIFTs
1. Evidence to Prove Completed Gift
Hayes v. Rinehart290 serves as a powerful reminder that merely
designating a person as the owner of an asset is not sufficient to show that
an inter vivos gift occurred. Decedent opened a certificate of deposit
("CD") entirely with his own funds but had the account titled in Daugh-
ter's name.291 After Decedent died, each of his other two children
claimed a one-third interest in the CD. 292 The trial court determined that
the CD was part of Decedent's estate.2 93 Daughter appealed. 294
The appellate court affirmed.2 95 Although Daughter proved that the
account was solely in her name, Daughter failed to prove that Decedent
made an inter vivos gift of the CD to her. 296 The court held that the trial
court did not violate the parol evidence rule when it allowed oral testi-
mony from the other children to show fraud.297 The testimony showed
that Decedent had placed the funds in Daughter's name to receive Medi-
caid and other government-supplied benefits.298 The court also held that
the trial court's determination that an inter vivos gift of the CD did not
occur for lack of donative intent was not so against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust.2 9 9
2. Setting Aside Deeds and Bank Account Contracts
Just like testamentary transfers, inter vivos transfers may be attacked
on grounds that the donor lacked capacity or was subject to undue influ-
ence, as shown in Dubree v. Blackwell.300 Friend purchased a house and
placed it in Donor's name.30 1 Later, Donor deeded the house to
Friend. 30 2 Donor also placed Friend's name on a joint account with right
of survivorship. 30 3 After Donor's death, the sole beneficiary of Donor's
will sued to set aside the deed and bank account contract, claiming Donor
lacked capacity and that Friend asserted undue influence on Donor.30 4
The jury found that Donor had capacity and was not subject to undue
influence.30 5 Beneficiary appealed. 30 6
290. Hayes v. Rinehart, 65 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.).
291. Id. at 287.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 289.
295. Id. at 288.
296. Id. at 289.
297. Id. at 288.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 289.
300. Dubree v. Blackwell, 67 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).




305. Id. at 288-89.
306. Dubree, 67 S.W.3d at 288-89.
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The appellate court affirmed.307 The court reviewed the evidence in
detail and found that the jury's findings were not against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence, and thus, were not manifestly
unjust. 30 8
3. Attorney-Client Privilege
In re Texas A&M-Corpus Christi Foundation, Inc.309 shows how issues
of attorney-client privilege may arise after the death of the donor of an
inter vivos gift. Donor made a $2 million inter vivos gift to Charity. 310
After Donor died, her Estate claimed that she lacked the mental capacity
to make the gift. 311 Charity sought discovery from two attorneys who
worked with Donor on estate and trust matters prior to when Donor
made the contested inter vivos gift.312 Estate and the attorneys asserted
that the attorneys were prohibited from testifying because of the attor-
ney-client privilege. 31 3 The court denied Charity's request to compel the
discovery and Charity sought mandamus relief.31 4
The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus because the dis-
covery Charity sought was not protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.315 The court first determined that appeal would not be a sufficient
remedy because without the requested discovery, the case would be need-
lessly tried.316 The court then concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Charity's motion to compel because the trial court
incorrectly determined that the information Charity wanted to discover
was protected by the attorney-client privilege. 317 Texas Rule of Evidence
503(d) provides that "[t]here is no privilege ... [a]s to a communication
relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same de-
ceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate
succession or by inter vivos transactions. '318 Charity sought testimony
from the attorneys, which was relevant to Donor's capacity in an action
between parties who were both claiming through the now-deceased Do-
nor.319 Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege does not bar the
discovery. 320
307. Id. at 292.
308. Id. at 291.
309. In re Tex. A&M-Corpus Christi Foundation, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding).
310. Id. at 359.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 359-60.
313. Id. at 360.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 361.
316. Id. at 360.
317. Id. at 361.
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